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Abstract 
Does foreign aid enable or constrain elite capture of public revenues? Reflecting on prominent debates in 
the foreign aid literature, we examine whether recipient preferences are consistent with a view that for-
eign donors wield substantial control over the flow of aid dollars, making elite capture more difficult and 
mass benefits more likely. We compare elite and mass support for foreign aid versus government spend-
ing on development projects through a survey experiment with behavioral outcomes. A key innovation is 
a parallel experiment on members of the Ugandan national parliament and a representative sample of 
Ugandan citizens. For two actual aid projects, we randomly assigned different funders to the projects. 
Significant treatment effects reveal that members of parliament support government programs over for-
eign aid, whereas citizens prefer aid over government. Donor control also implies that citizens should 
favor foreign aid more and elites less as their perceptions of government clientelism and corruption in-
crease. We explore this and report on other alternative mechanisms. Effects for citizens and elites are 
most apparent for those perceiving significant government corruption, suggesting that both sets of sub-
jects perceive significant donor control over aid.  
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Introduction 
Who controls foreign aid and how it is used? Academic disputes rage over what foreign 
aid allows politicians in recipient countries to do. For some scholars, aid enables political elites 
to buy votes, build militaries for repression, and enrich themselves through corruption.2 Aid may 
thus undermine citizens’ ability to hold political elites accountable for how public revenues are 
spent.3 In this view, foreign assistance is often captured by powerful political elites in recipient 
countries, thus benefiting politicians and hurting citizens.  
Alternatively, others argue that foreign aid can bypass corrupt political leaders and target 
the delivery of needed public goods directly to recipients even as it promotes civil society actors 
that can demand better governance.4 Additionally, aid can enable government capacity building 
and contribute to the development of better-functioning institutions and thus push politicians to 
reduce corruption and mismanagement.5 Understanding the incentives of recipient governments 
to use aid for their own political purposes, donors can target aid toward specific projects, impose 
conditions, and limit the fungibility of aid revenues.6 By this accounting, foreign donors have con-
siderable influence over the distribution of foreign assistance, thus bypassing elites and benefit-
ing the masses. 
                                                     
2 Alesina and Weder 2002; Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Easterly 2006; Morrison 2009; 2012; Moyo 2009; Svensson 
2000.  
3 Knack 2009; Morrison 2009; Moyo 2009; Ross 2004. 
4 Bermeo 2016; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007; McLean and Schneider 2014; Mosley 2015; Wright and 
Winters 2010. 
5 Baser and Morgan 2008; Riddell 2007. 
6 Altincekic and Bearce 2014; Bearce and Tirone 2010; Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu 1998. 
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There is a great deal at stake in this debate. As much as $7.1 trillion in development as-
sistance has flowed from developed to developing countries since 1945,7 representing a mean-
ingful share of inter-governmental financial exchanges. However, if aid — by propping up despots 
and enabling corruption — does more harm than good, as some scholars have claimed, donor 
governments should reconsider their aid practices and reduce their commitments. If aid, on the 
other hand, brings more benefits than costs, then continuing or perhaps even increasing foreign 
assistance would be advisable. In addition, our study suggests that how aid is delivered matters: 
conditionality, bypass, and monitoring may make a difference.  Past aid scholarship has appeared 
to significantly influence major policy decisions at the World Bank in its move to randomized 
evaluations8 and for the U.S. government in its creation of the Millennium Challenge Corpora-
tion,9 among other examples. The current scholarly debate thus involves more than academic 
stakes.  
We consider two important elements that have been overlooked to date. First, we focus 
attention on the perceptions of and preferences for aid of both political elites and citizens in 
recipient countries through parallel survey experiments with behavioral outcomes on nearly two-
thirds of the Ugandan National Parliament and a nationally representative sample of Ugandan 
citizens. Ugandan elites and citizens experience the effects of aid projects continually due to aid’s 
important role in the Ugandan economy. Examining the attitudes and behaviors of political elites 
                                                     
7 Tierney et al. 2011. 
8 Tollefson 2015. 
9 Hook 2008. 
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— in this case members of parliament — is important given their policymaking powers and status 
in governing coalitions.10  
Studying the opinions of ordinary citizens in semi-democratic, developing countries may 
require additional justification is also important, for four key reasons. First, seeking to prolong 
their rule and concerned that public protests or mobilization may threaten their tenure, many 
autocratic leaders — including Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni in the country under study 
here — pay close attention to public opinion in pursuing policies, be they domestic or foreign.11 
Second, citizens may hold information about the effects of policy on outcomes they value, so 
public opinion can reveal insights about the world that are otherwise unavailable. Third, even if 
citizens are misinformed, they predicate actions on their beliefs, so understanding public beliefs 
can illuminate political behavior. Fourth and finally, scholars have long decried the “broken feed-
back loop” in which aid decision-makers in donor countries are disconnected from the ultimate 
beneficiaries of their bequests,12 so asking recipient publics about their perceptions of aid takes 
a step toward repairing the faulty feedback system. 
As we discuss below, different theories about the impact of aid depend on and make as-
sumptions about elites’ and citizens’ attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. Examining these varying 
assumptions against evidence might yield a clearer picture about the role of aid. It should help 
us to understand under what conditions different theories of aid and its effects are more likely 
                                                     
10 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003. 
11 Weeks 2008; 2014. 
12 Martens et al. 2002. 
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to operate. Hence, perceptions and preferences — especially as revealed by behavioral outcomes 
— matter in their own right. 
To address the second overlooked element in prior studies, we propose a meaningful 
baseline against which to compare aid: government projects, which provide the most relevant 
alternative for providing public goods. Most theories of aid depend on expectations about do-
mestic elites, arguing that they play a significant role in shaping how foreign aid and government 
programs affect developing countries. Yet, to our knowledge, no direct, systematic evidence ex-
ists that employs politicians as respondents reflecting on aid and similar government programs. 
Studies comparing recipient citizens’ support for foreign- and government-sponsored develop-
ment projects are likewise rare. Probing elite and mass perceptions about foreign and govern-
ment assistance may therefore contribute significantly to understanding aid. 
The expectations that guided us focus on the belief that donors have significant control 
over the aid they provide. Uncovering direct evidence for this belief is difficult given the complex 
set of actors and procedures in the long policymaking chain connecting donor allocation decisions 
to outcomes in recipient countries. Thus, we designed a study that might indirectly provide evi-
dence for or against this belief by probing the attitudes and behaviors toward aid projects exhib-
ited by both elites and common citizens in a recipient country. It is possible that donors have 
significant influence over aid and can channel and condition it with a meaningful degree of inde-
pendence from recipient government manipulation. This is not to claim that donors completely 
determine the disposition of aid, but merely that they can channel and monitor it so that it aligns 
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more closely with citizen interests in the provision of public goods compared to government pro-
grams. This suggests very different expectations for elite and citizen perceptions of and actions 
toward foreign assistance. It also implies that citizens and elites most attuned to the likelihood 
of politicians’ capturing public resources should especially differ in their dispositions toward aid. 
If this view is correct, elites should be unable to capture aid easily, so they therefore should less 
strongly support foreign aid and instead prefer government programs, which they can appropri-
ate more readily. Citizens, on the other hand, benefit more fully from foreign assistance than 
government programs, so they should evince stronger support for foreign aid relative to elite-
dominated government programs. And those citizens who perceive the greatest amount of cor-
ruption and clientelism should prefer aid the most. 
This belief that donors control aid contrasts with an alternative conceptualization that 
recipient elites largely capture foreign assistance. This belief assumes that aid is highly fungible 
and can be used by recipient politicians as they will. Thus, political leaders should more strongly 
prefer aid because they can capture it like other non-tax revenues and use it for their own pur-
poses.13 Citizens, on the other hand, should not support foreign assistance because elites are 
capturing the aid, causing similar patterns as in countries with substantial non-tax revenues such 
as oil.14 And those perceiving the most corruption and clientelism in government should be most 
opposed to aid. 
                                                     
13 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; 2009. 
14 Morrison 2009; 2012. 
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To uncover evidence reflecting on these alternatives, we designed two parallel experi-
ments and executed them in 2012 in Uganda. The experiments contrast members of parliament 
(MPs) and citizen support for development projects in treatment conditions attributed to foreign 
donors compared to identical projects in a control condition in which no donor was explicitly 
mentioned and that most sampled Ugandans took to be the domestic government.15  
In line with the expectations that donors have significant control over aid, we find that 
members of parliament are significantly more likely to support projects in the control condition 
rather than treatment projects identifying foreign donors. However, citizens are significantly 
more likely to support foreign donors, precisely the opposite of the elites. Effect sizes are gener-
ally modest and approach a ceiling, but the differences are significant statistically and robust 
across a variety of specifications.  
We evaluate possible subgroup effects and the results suggest that both elites and citi-
zens believe that donors have substantial control over aid and thus subjects behave accordingly. 
MPs who perceive greater government corruption are especially likely to prefer government pro-
jects over foreign aid, whereas citizens perceiving government corruption are significantly more 
likely to support the aid projects. We consider many alternative mechanisms, including that 
members of parliament simply see government funds as more effective, and provide evidence 
                                                     
15 A minority of subjects believed the control condition was actually a foreign donor, but this works in favor of the 
null hypothesis of no significant difference between treatment conditions and control. The differences reported thus 
understate elites’ and citizens’ contrasting preferences for aid versus government projects, a result we detail in the 
robustness section. 
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that this is not the case. In addition to corruption and effectiveness, we also consider other mech-
anisms that might underlie these differences: partisanship, ethnicity, nationalism, incumbency, 
and a foreign reputation effect. In general, the subgroup results provide null or inconsistent evi-
dence for these possible alternative mechanisms. Taken together, our results suggest that — at 
least in the minds of those with direct experience — aid may be less susceptible to political cap-
ture than government resources. 
Theory 
Sensing a diminishing utility in continuing macro-level debates over aid allocation and ef-
fectiveness,16 scholars have turned to examining the specific micro-level political economies of 
aid in donor and recipient countries though notably with a conspicuous absence of data on polit-
ical elites around which micro-level theories are built. We frame two positions in this debate, 
which represent opposite views of the relationship between donors and recipients. These are 
endpoints in the otherwise continuous bargaining relationship that exists between these two sets 
of actors.  
One prominent set of beliefs argues that elites capture aid. This approach posits that do-
nors provide foreign aid in exchange for policy concessions from the recipient government. When 
donors care most about the foreign policy behavior of recipient countries — e.g., their alliance 
behavior or trading relations, then the recipient government has enormous bargaining power. 
                                                     
16 e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000. 
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Donors then must give aid without much concern for its use by the recipient. Donors must pro-
vide highly fungible aid such that the recipient political leaders who must implement these policy 
concessions will benefit. Aid thus becomes a source of fungible government revenue, like other 
non-tax revenues including oil — and with potentially similar negative effects on the economy 
and polity, as in the well-known resource curse.17 By this accounting, donors provide aid in mini-
mally invasive ways and benefit from recipient policy concessions.18 This approach emphasizing 
donor self-interest is not without foundation; some research and conventional wisdom note that 
donors give aid for political over humanitarian reasons and therefore relinquish much control 
over aid delivery.19 
For recipient leaders, fungible aid is a boon because they can capture the money and 
benefit directly; for recipient citizens, it is a bane because, as a result of elite capture, they fail to 
receive public goods and therefore suffer as a result. Prominent studies have held that external 
sources of money, such as natural resources and aid, enable politicians to entrench themselves 
rather than be held accountable.20 By this logic, political elites in the donor and recipient coun-
tries are the major beneficiaries of aid, as aid increases their political longevity,21 whereas citizens 
in poor recipient countries are the biggest losers, as mass publics are forced to accept policy 
concessions they oppose and to endure more corruption from their own leaders.22 This approach 
                                                     
17 See Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007; Ross 1999. 
18 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; 2009. 
19 Alesina and Dollar 2000. 
20 Bräutigam 2000; Gervasoni 2010; Morrison 2009; Smith 2008. 
21 Morrison 2009; 2012. 
22 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009, 311. 
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suggests that the public and political leaders in recipient countries may have very different atti-
tudes toward aid. Leaders should like fungible aid since they can direct it as they want, and pub-
lics, at least the majority of them, should be less enthusiastic since they benefit little. 
Against this argument we contrast the approach that holds that donors exert influence 
over the aid they provide. This viewpoint attributes more bargaining power and different inter-
ests to donors and it is consistent with the fact that most aid is targeted for specific projects, has 
conditions attached to it, and often bypasses governments. This argument builds on multiple 
strands of prior work pointing to the possibility that donors are conscious of the potential for aid 
to be mismanaged and therefore direct, oversee, and channel the aid in ways that are more likely 
to bypass corrupt politicians and therefore to produce public goods in recipient countries. Donors 
understand many of the challenges they face in developing countries and try to act strategically 
to advance their goals. By this accounting, donors do more than seek policy concessions and they 
thus pursue aims beyond those implied by aid as an intergovernmental “bribe”.23 We concede 
that donors almost certainly give aid strategically at times for political ends.24 However, many 
studies of aid allocation find that aid goes disproportionately to poorer and needier countries, 
which suggests that significant amounts of aid target poverty relief.25 
Donors may be more interested in promoting domestic public goods, such as democracy 
and development, which may entail large domestic policy changes by the recipient government. 
                                                     
23 Morgenthau 1962. 
24 See Qian 2015. 
25 Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bodenstein and Kemmerling 2015; Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp 2014; Lee and Lim 
2014. 
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These goals may be much closer as well to the preferences of many citizens. To achieve their 
development aims, donors try to limit fungibility and target, commit, disburse, and monitor aid 
in ways that do not benefit leaders, but rather pursue broader goals including providing public 
goods. Thus some citizens, especially those perceiving the government to be corrupt and clien-
telist, may be supportive of conditionality as it promotes their preferred goals for the aid money. 
Donors can exert control in part by committing aid to specific projects, attaching conditions to 
the use of aid, employing elaborate procurement rules, and instituting strong accounting and 
reporting requirements for recipients.26 Such rules make elite capture more difficult. In contrast 
to an approach emphasizing donor allocation of relatively unrestricted fungible aid, this line of 
reasoning sees donors actively using aid to provide public goods for recipients by targeting aid 
for particular projects, attaching conditions to aid, providing both non-fungible and fungible aid, 
altering channels of delivery, and even withholding (or threatening to withhold) aid in response 
to recipient leader decisions. In fact, at a broad level, Bermeo shows that donors’ goals have 
changed since the end of the Cold War and that they are now more focused on development and 
democracy promotion. She demonstrates that donors pursue “strategic development” in pur-
posefully allocating different types of aid to different types of countries, often targeting improve-
ments in government capacity rather than providing narrow benefits to specific leaders.27  
Even if aid fails to strengthen institutions or build capacity directly, donors may find alter-
native means to provide aid while avoiding capture by incumbent politicians. Dietrich shows that 
                                                     
26 Lamoreaux, Michas, and Schultz 2015. 
27 Bermeo 2010; 2011. 
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donors strategically decide how much aid to give directly to governments and how much to by-
pass them depending on corruption levels and institutional capacity.28 This “bypass aid” can sup-
port opposition parties, watchdog media, and civil society organizations that might effectively 
demand more accountability and that, evidence suggests, ultimately strengthens democracy.29 
In strategically targeting and delivering aid, donors provide less fungible aid.30 Indeed, 
donors appear to systematically emphasize less manipulable sectors when targeting aid to more-
corrupt governments.31 Thus, donors seem able to restrict aid in ways that stymie recipient poli-
ticians’ self-serving designs. 
Foreign aid — especially if it is monitored, has conditions attached to it, or is less fungible 
— may thus provide more public goods since politicians are less able to divert it to themselves 
and their allies.32 Aid may not be, in fact, similar to other non-tax revenues such as oil. If donors 
exercise substantial control over aid, then it follows that we should expect leaders and citizens 
to view aid differently. In contrast to citizens who may prefer foreign aid, leaders who do not 
benefit as much personally may support aid less enthusiastically. 
Extant studies address the problem from multiple methodological perspectives, but the 
debate remains unresolved. While our experimental approach cannot resolve the dispute, fo-
cused experiments using elites and citizens may contribute to this debate by providing evidence 
                                                     
28 Dietrich 2013. 
29 Aronow, Carnegie, and Marinov 2012; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007; Scott and Steele 2011. 
30 Indeed, aid may be less fungible than originally believed. See Altincekic and Bearce 2014. 
31 Winters and Martinez 2015. 
32 Mavrotas and Ouattara 2006. 
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about who supports foreign aid or government funding for development projects, and their rea-
sons for doing so. We readily acknowledge that our experiments do not and cannot provide direct 
evidence of donor control or elite capture. Rather, they are designed to provide important indi-
rect evidence by revealing the attitudes and behaviors of different classes of subjects — elites 
and citizens — toward aid, the conditions under which they support foreign assistance, and thus 
their beliefs about whether or not donors exert some control over the aid or elites capture it. 
While this cannot definitively settle the dispute, it does advance the evidence base using a 
method with high internal validity. 
If aid is captured, donors do not exercise control over aid, and recipient elites can use aid 
as they please, then politicians should prefer foreign aid over government-funded programs. 
Leaders will thus be freer to use the aid for their own purposes compared to tax revenues for 
which they must answer to the public.33 If, on the other hand, foreign donors exercise more con-
trol over aid funds, by possessing the capacity to audit, constrain, and punish politicians who try 
to use aid for their own political ends, then we expect a different result: elites should prefer 
government programs to foreign aid projects. Political leaders should be keen to use available 
resources to maintain their privileged position and should therefore prefer the funding source 
with fewer constraints.34   
                                                     
33 To the extent that tax revenues are also not constrained by the public and aid is fungible with them, then elites 
should be indifferent between the two sources. 
34 See van de Walle 2003, 313. Similarly, what Rothchild (1986) called “hegemonial exchange” and Bayart (1993)  
“reciprocal assimilation of elites,” clientelism pervades Africa since political stability there has often been con-
structed by using state resources to forge alliances across different social elites, often in the form of overt power-
sharing arrangements (van de Walle 2003). 
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Preferences of citizens should move in the opposite direction. If donors exercise sufficient 
control over aid such that it reaches the citizens in greater volume and efficacy, then citizens 
should prefer foreign assistance over government spending. This finding should be especially 
likely for those who perceive the government to be very clientelist or corrupt. If, on the other 
hand, donors cannot impose control and aid is seen as reinforcing the problems characterizing 
all non-tax revenues, then citizens should more strongly support government spending over aid. 
Along most major byways in Uganda, as in many developing countries, signs tying projects 
to foreign or domestic donors crowd the roadside and therefore would make the connection of 
aid to outcomes possible. Of course, citizens’ perceptions may be mistaken about the effects of 
aid, and we are open to interpreting our data in this light. Nevertheless, even if citizens are wrong 
about aid, their perceptions matter in their own right. Voters have attitudes and beliefs first and 
then take actions or not based on those priors. Politicians likely have a better grasp of the effects 
of different sources of revenue on their political careers.  Members of parliament often influence 
how aid is distributed in recipient countries. Combining studies of the two subject pools and com-
paring their attitudes and behaviors toward the same experimental conditions therefore should 
usefully illuminate our understanding of who controls aid.  
The Ugandan Context 
Context matters for the beliefs we are examining. In geo-strategically important develop-
ing countries and in ones that are democratic and well governed, prior research suggests that 
donors should be less influential in and less worried about the recipient’s use of funds. Channel-
ing aid and monitoring and bypassing the government should be less possible and/or necessary. 
16 
 
Uganda, like many sub-Saharan countries, does not fit this description. Uganda currently has a 
semi-authoritarian regime in which the government of Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) has retained power for 30 years.35 In 2006, Uganda began holding multiparty 
elections; yet they have not been fully free and fair.36 Scholars describe the party’s ruling meth-
ods as relying heavily on patronage and clientelism to retain its control.37 As one recent study 
points out, “In Uganda, the ruling NRM has established patronage networks throughout the coun-
try through the use of local government. The civil service is another such network of patronage, 
and perhaps the most important is the military. These clientelist networks, while consolidating 
key sources of support, at the same time undermine governance and erode the viability of insti-
tutions and leadership.”38 In 2012 when the study was fielded, Uganda ranked on the higher end 
of corruption scales, scoring in the 74th percentile (130th out of 176) on Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perceptions Index.39  
Uganda also receives substantial amounts of foreign development assistance; like most 
poor developing countries, it depends on two major sources of revenues: taxes and fees collected 
by the government and foreign aid. Since the 1990s, aid including off-budget sources has equaled 
approximately 70 percent of government expenditures. Moreover, aid encompassed about 15 
percent of total GDP for much of that period, though the share has declined lately. Our survey 
confirmed that citizens had general awareness of foreign aid. More than two thirds of subjects 
                                                     
35 Greene 2010; van de Walle 2007. 
36 Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Hyde and Marinov 2012. 
37 Green 2010; Muhumuza 2009; Tripp 2010; van de Walle 2003; 2007. 
38 Tripp 2010, 25. 
39  Transparency International 2012. 
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knew that more than 30 percent of the Ugandan budget comes from foreign aid; and the majority 
of subjects were aware of foreign aid flowing to their local areas.   
Uganda is typical of African countries in terms of its democratization processes, current 
level of democratization, and executive dominance.40 The Ugandan parliament has competitive 
elections and, while it is weaker than the executive, it is more than a rubber stamp and is a venue 
for important and lively debates.41 Indeed the reading of the budget each year, which includes 
discussion of aid, is one of the most controversial and important matters for every MP. As the 
literature on parliaments in authoritarian systems has pointed out, these legislatures often are 
designed to impose constraints on the executive.42 In these contexts then, donors are more likely 
to be active and concerned about their aid dollars and often unwilling to let recipient govern-
ments control the funds. 
Research Design 
To investigate competing beliefs about donor control versus aid capture, we conducted 
two different survey experiments in the field as well as two follow-up surveys. First, we carried 
out an experiment on a convenience sample of 276 of the 375 Members of the 9th Ugandan Par-
liament (the sitting legislature) and 78 former MPs from the 8th Parliament (total current and 
former MPs surveyed is 354). Although we sampled MPs by convenience, the distribution is very 
                                                     
40 Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Resnick and van de Walle 2013. If we consider Uganda’s level of democracy (Polity 
IV score) and degree of aid dependence (World Bank’s World Development Indicator of net official development 
assistance per capita), Uganda is very similar to Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Chad, and the Central African Repub-
lic. While there are other factors such as ethnic diversity, colonial history, and levels of economic development, 
similarity on these two key measures are important for understanding how generalizable our results may be. 
41 Humphreys and Weinstein 2012. 
42 Boix 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Malesky and Schuler 2010. 
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similar to the actual parliament at that time, which we discuss below.43 Second, we conducted a 
nationally representative experiment on nearly 3,600 citizens in 42 of Uganda’s 112 districts. We 
used a clustered random sample for the citizen survey to ensure regional and political represent-
ativeness. Both experiments were similar, but not identical, and were performed between June 
and October 2012 by local Ugandan enumerators. In September 2012 we conducted a smaller 
representative, follow-up survey of 460 citizen respondents, and then in the summer of 2015 a 
follow-up series of interviews with 28 MPs. To maximize the number of responses in the 2012 
MP survey, we attempted to conduct a census of all current MPs and achieved a 72 percent re-
sponse rate in the main survey. While key aspects of the experimental instruments were kept 
identical for each group to facilitate comparisons, the citizen survey was lengthier. 
The samples of respondents reflect the underlying populations well, and assignment to 
treatment conditions is not predicted by available observables.44 Key variables, such as educa-
tion, gender, age, party, religion, and region, were not significantly related to whether citizens 
were assigned to a given experimental condition. For the MP survey, Appendix Table A1 presents 
descriptive statistics from our sample and from Parliament as a whole for gender, party, region 
and MP type, which generally matches the 9th Parliament as a whole. The distribution of MPs by 
region is largely representative, though it slightly oversamples those from the Central region and 
undersamples those from the Northern region. Finally, assignment to treatment conditions 
                                                     
43 See Appendix Table A1. 
44 See Appendix Table A2. 
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among MPs is not significantly related to party, gender, MP type, or region, so there is good 
covariate balance across experimental conditions.  
We chose to conduct our experiment on MPs as opposed to other government officials 
for a number of reasons. First, parliament is where the budget and the acquisition of aid (both 
budget support and project aid) is discussed and decided. Second, MPs very clearly had experi-
ence with aid both in parliamentary debates and in managing aid funds (53% of our MP inter-
viewees said they had personally managed aid funds). Moreover, MPs value such projects in their 
districts; a majority of them in interviews said that they received praise and appreciation from 
citizens for such projects. Third, Uganda’s parliamentary system fuses the executive and legisla-
tive branches, and thus we are able to also survey cabinet ministers who play an important role 
in decision-making.45 In fact, the experiment includes 49 government ministers (this includes 
deputy ministers), 22 shadow cabinet members (the opposition’s cabinet), and both government 
and opposition chief whips. 
Interventions 
The experimental manipulation presented each subject with a randomly assigned project 
description and a randomly assigned funder for that project. This between-subjects design is im-
portant for eliciting comparisons between government and foreign donor projects where direct 
comparisons might be too sensitive. Due to the sensitivity of the comparison, while we explicitly 
stated foreign donors in the treatment conditions, we used a control condition in which no donor 
                                                     
45 However, we find no difference between ministers, committee chairs, and backbenchers.  
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was named to represent government-funded projects. In poor developing countries like Uganda, 
public goods projects like those we focused on have two major sources of funding: government 
revenues from taxes/fees and foreign aid. Hence the control condition could only be interpreted 
as one of these two sources. To the extent that individuals thought it was foreign aid, this made 
finding treatment effects for our experiment more difficult. But we felt this choice was critical 
since it enabled us to avoid social desirability bias related to naming a semi-autocratic govern-
ment to its citizens and its own members of parliament and asking about support of that govern-
ment’s projects.46 Our concern about social desirability bias was most acute for the MPs, and we 
felt we could not ask the public and MPs different questions and then credibly compare re-
sponses later. We also conducted follow-up manipulation checks, which showed that most sub-
jects interpreted the control as the government. Moreover, if all subjects had interpreted the 
control as the government the results would have been even stronger. We provide an extended 
discussion and proof of this in the robustness section and in the appendix.  
We randomly assigned the manipulation for actual pipeline projects, thus avoiding active 
deception. The projects were co-financed by the World Bank and the African Development Bank 
and thus sponsored and managed by member-country governments, which allowed us to manip-
ulate the name of the donor presented to subjects. We also randomly assigned the type of pro-
ject: an infrastructure project (electricity) and an education project. In order to generalize more 
                                                     
46 Concern for biased responses out of fear about the government seems fairly reasonable in a non-democratic con-
text like Uganda. In round 5 of Afrobarometer completed in 2012, the same year as our study, 50% of the respond-
ents said they did not feel completely free to say whatever they believe, and 1/3 said they felt some kind of pressure 
about whom to vote for. Moreover, 63% admitted fear of being intimidated in election campaigns.  
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fully, we randomly assigned six different donors, including the four major multilateral and bilat-
eral donors in Uganda and two additional multilateral and bilateral donors characterized generi-
cally. MPs, in order to increase the number of observations, were presented with and asked to 
express their support in various ways for both the electricity and education projects individually 
(and in random order) but only one donor. Citizens received only one of the two possible projects. 
To achieve greater generalizability, we used two different project types and six different 
foreign donor types. The four specific donors named — the World Bank, the African Development 
Bank, the United States, and China — are the most active in Uganda and accounted for 54% of 
total aid disbursements.  We also chose the electricity and education projects because they rep-
resent the types of projects that can be given selectively to constituencies that support politi-
cians. For the mass survey, we randomly assigned the donor and the project type. Neither project 
type in the mass survey was significantly preferred over the other in the between-subjects design, 
which may reflect the fact that both types of projects are desperately sought after in Uganda. 
Because there were no significant differences between project types and among foreign donors, 
we focus on the difference between all aid donors and the control condition, which most subjects 
took to be the government. 
Our framing question read, “The Electricity Sector Development Project will improve the 
reliability of and increase access to electricity. One major aspect of the project is to extend elec-
tricity to those who do not yet have access to it. The project may require your community to 
provide funding for maintenance in the future. [This project will be funded by the {RANDOMLY 
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ASSIGNED FUNDER}.] How much would you support this project?” The text for the education 
project is in the appendix.  
We included the sentence about future expenses (“may require your community to pro-
vide funding…”) to increase the respondents’ sense that this project might cost them in the me-
dium and long term to support it. Given that aid may be perceived as “free money” whereas 
government programs may imply increased taxes, we were concerned that offering a project 
without any noted costs might lead all subjects to support it. A skeptic might worry that the added 
cost condition is not sufficient to overcome a bias toward “free” resources, which is a reasonable 
concern that we took measures to address as detailed in the robustness section.  
Alternatively, in the MP experiment, the funding organizations we randomly assigned 
were the World Bank, the Government of the United States, a generic multilateral institution (“an 
international organization funded by many countries”), a generic bilateral agency (“a single for-
eign country”), and No Donor, in which we omitted the sentence indicating which agency was 
funding the project and served as the control condition. In the mass experiment, we also included 
the African Development Bank and the Government of China because the larger subject pool 
enabled greater statistical power to probe the effects of additional treatment conditions.47 These 
four donors represent the majority of aid projects in Uganda, and the inclusion of the generic 
bilateral and multilateral donors allows us to effectively tap preferences generally toward any 
foreign aid donor that might come to subjects’ minds. 
                                                     
47 We also tested the effect of individual donors. We estimated difference in means tests and across all groups; there 
is never a consistently significant effect between donors across outcome measures.  
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In the control condition, we assumed recipients would associate this with domestic gov-
ernment spending. We mentioned nothing about foreign aid in this version of the survey. We did 
the same for the MPs to avoid social desirability bias because we feared that government MPs 
might feel they should claim to support projects by the government no matter what they be-
lieved. But as we describe below, this design choice actually works in favor of the null hypothesis 
of no difference between treatment and control; and therefore our results understate the full 
extent of treatment effects, as shown in the robustness section below. 
Further, our intervention focuses on one type of aid: project aid. Project aid is much more 
infungible and channeled than budget support. It is the most common type, it constitutes the 
overwhelming monetary share, and it is the most visible to citizens and thus would maximize our 
ability to obtain informed preferences regarding aid. According to the AidData information base, 
between 2000 and 2012 Uganda received 157 budget support grants and loans summing to $3.2 
billion. Over the same period, the country was host to 16,019 aid projects summing to $24.5 
billion in total aid. This suggests that budget-support aid in Uganda constitutes 1 percent of the 
count, but 13 percent of total Ugandan aid. This is roughly on par with the rest of sub-Saharan 
Africa, which received 3,811 budget support grants and loans for $57.5 billion in relation to 
352,839 projects that totaled $615 billion. Budget support in the region thus comprised 1 percent 
of the count but 9 percent of the money.48 All donors to Uganda give project aid, while only some 
                                                     
48 Tierney et al. 2011. 
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give budget support. We thus chose to use projects in our experiment so that we could explore 
attitudes toward all types of donors.49  
Outcomes 
To measure the outcome of support or opposition for the foreign- or domestic-funded 
projects, we asked all respondents to first express their level of support, then to report to us their 
willingness to convey their support to a higher authority (Party leader for MPs, and Local Council 
official for citizens), sign a petition voicing their support, and actually sign the petition.50  
MPs were asked to express their willingness to coordinate with peers in support of (or in 
opposition to) the project, tell constituents about the project, rally locals in support of (or in 
opposition to) the project, and sign a letter to the President in support of or opposition to the 
projects. Citizens, but not elites, were also asked if they were willing to send a text message (SMS) 
and to actually send the SMS in support (or not) of the project.  
Because the MPs were presented with both projects, we have two observations for each, 
except the petition to the president. Each MP was asked to sign a single petition that reported 
their level of support for both projects to the President, thus we have one observation for each 
MP on this outcome. This design choice was made to reduce the burden on the MPs and to lessen 
redundancy of sending two nearly identical letters to the president. Donors were independently 
                                                     
49 Project aid and budget-support aid might have different political effects, with budget support being more cor-
ruptible than project aid. See Gazibo 2013; Tripp 2013.  
50 Full text of the petition is included in the Appendix. The petition only asks them to sign without specifying a foreign 
donor or government.  
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assigned to MPs such that MPs could receive the same or different donors across the two condi-
tions. These various measures of support present the respondents with varying levels of cost 
(attitudinal vs. behavioral responses) and are used as the key outcome variables to gauge support 
for projects across treatment arms. 
Results 
Do people hold beliefs consistent with a view that donors exert control or aid is captured? 
We ask whether MPs and citizens are more supportive of government programs or foreign aid 
projects and compare their responses. We also consider possible mechanisms that could explain 
the overall trends in preferences. The donor-control argument suggests that perceptions of gov-
ernment corruption and clientelism should be most telling. 
Differences across groups 
Figure 1 reports the results from difference-in-means tests comparing levels of support 
under all of the aid treatment conditions compared to the control condition for MPs and masses. 
Appendix Table A3 presents the numerical results.51 Panel A reports outcomes that were meas-
ured for all respondents (plus the SMS and Presidential Letter outcomes for citizens and MPs, 
respectively), and Panel B reports outcomes for those only measured for MPs. These overall re-
sults show that with only one exception, MPs are consistently more supportive of government 
                                                     
51 Using randomization inference, our results are almost identical and are available from the authors.  
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projects than foreign aid. This difference in support is significant in 3 of the 9 outcomes, and 
treatment effects range from less than 1 to 12 percentage points.52  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table A3 also shows that citizens consistently prefer aid over government projects; this 
difference in support is significant in 5 of the 6 outcomes, including the behavioral outcomes. The 
treatment effects range from 2 to 4 percentage points, which are modest but nonetheless signif-
icant statistically. These smaller substantive differences may result from strong ceiling effects 
given that the projects are extremely popular and therefore clustered near the upper bound of 
100 percent support. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
When we consider only those who passed our manipulation checks, our results are even 
stronger, as Figure 2 shows. These are the citizens who understood the experiment. We did not 
do manipulation checks on the MPs out of sensitivity to their positions. For those who passed the 
manipulation checks, all but one of the treatment effects range from 7 to 15 percentage points. 
Because dropping subjects that did not pass the manipulation checks affects the representative-
ness of the sample,53 we calculated the complier average causal effects (CACE). To calculate 
                                                     
52 The results reported for MPs in Table A3 include both observations. To account for dependence across observa-
tions, we conducted logistic regression analyses and clustered on the MP. In doing so, the significance levels for the 
three outcomes significant in difference-in-means tests attenuate some, but are broadly similar. Moreover, we in-
cluded only one observation per MP (or used randomization inference) and see similar results. 
53 Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances 2012. 
27 
 
CACE,54 we use a 2-stage least squares model. Because we have information from the manipula-
tion check that helps us understand better what people perceived when they received the control 
or treatment, we can use that check as a measure of compliance. We use assignment to treat-
ment as an instrument to predict compliance (perceptions in the manipulation check), which in 
turn predicts level of support for aid vs. government assistance.55 The results are reported in the 
lower portion of Table A4 and are qualitatively the same as those in the baseline intent-to-treat 
model. We use the full sample for the rest of the discussion, but all our results — available from 
the authors— hold for the group that passed the manipulation checks as well. 
Why do these differences appear? 
These findings seem to be consistent with a view that donors have substantial control 
over aid. So we next ask what mechanism might account for these differences. To provide a plau-
sible explanation, a subgroup mechanism needs to differ substantively between the masses and 
MPs, to explain the differences between the treatment and control within each subgroup, and 
most of all to account for the differences between treatment and control across the elites and 
masses. The logic of donor control implies that perceptions of government corruption and clien-
telism ought to be most associated with and magnify the effects observed above. We also explore 
                                                     
54 Gerber and Green 2012. 
55 The manipulation check allows us to distinguish those that received the treatment and thought it was the treat-
ment (complier-treated), received control and thought it was control (complier-control), received treatment but 
thought control (never-takers), and received control but thought treatment (always takers). Some respondents an-
swered “Don’t Know” in the manipulation check rather than offer the name of a specific donor or “None” for control. 
As no specific entity was named in the control condition, we classified the “Don’t Know” responses along with the 
“None”. 
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numerous other possibilities – foreign reputation, partisanship, ethnicity, nationalism, govern-
ment incumbency bias, parliamentary leadership, MP socio-demographics, MP perceptions of 
government effectiveness – and report on them in detail in the appendix.56 None of these addi-
tional mechanisms received consistent or strong support, in contrast to perceptions of corruption 
and clientelism, which did find substantial support. For the perceptions of clientelism and cor-
ruption mechanism we report results below; we first rule out a number of other alternative 
mechanisms.   
Ruling out Some Possible Mechanisms 
Multiple alternative mechanisms reported in the appendix are worth discussing here. 
First, the differences may arise due to MP demographics. It is possible that the results we observe 
are driven by the fact that MPs are different in terms of class, wealth, education, and status. 
Simply by being elite, one could develop a different perspective on development funding. To ad-
dress this concern, we split the mass sample into two demographic categories – high and low 
– and conducted the same analysis on the subgroups. The high types are those who are demo-
graphically similar to MPs (i.e., pay taxes, are highly educated, urban, well informed), and we find 
no significant differences in preferences across these two sub-samples of citizens.57 It is thus un-
likely that demographic factors are driving our results. 
Another alternative story about MPs could be that backbenchers differ from leaders. 
Leaders in parliament could prefer aid over government funds because they are the ones who 
                                                     
56 Figures A1-A14. 
57 See Appendix Figures A13 and A14. 
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can capture foreign aid, regardless of donor control. We test whether parliamentary leaders have 
significantly different preferences for government and/or donor funds than the rank and file. 
Appendix Figures A11 and A12 show that while backbenchers do not have a clear preference for 
one form of funds over another,  MPs in the leadership are more willing to sign both the donor 
and president petitions in support of the government control condition, and thus they have 
stronger preferences for government, not aid funds. In his article, Good shows that one reason 
MP backbenchers may have less strong preferences regarding fund type is because they have a 
harder time getting access to government funds than MP leaders do.58 Thus, it does not appear 
to be the case that parliamentary leaders support aid because they can capture it.  
Another alternative is that MPs who support government funding over aid funding might 
do so as a result of positive views of the effectiveness of government funding in comparison with 
aid funding. It could be that MPs differ from the public in that they generally find the government 
to be more effective. Our survey and experiment provide no support for this claim. MPs on aver-
age do not, in fact, hold the view that government-funded projects are superior. From the survey 
we find that only 16% of MPs reported that government funds, compared to aid funds, are more 
likely to go to the most needy, are more effective and less wasteful, are better at meeting the 
needs of constituents, and that government funds are more transparent. We find that 67% of 
MPs have a more positive view of government on at least one of these outcomes, while 84% have 
a more positive view of aid donors on at least one measure. When asked who they think would 
                                                     
58 Good 1994. 
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be the most effective in carrying out the electricity or education project, only 23 percent of MPs 
named the Ugandan government. Moreover, roughly 80 percent of MPs thought foreign aid had 
a positive effect on the government and their constituents. Finally, MPs trust foreign donors 
more than even the masses do.59 Therefore, MPs actually tend to have less confidence in the 
efficacy of government-funded projects compared to foreign aid, even though they tend to more 
readily support government programs.  
It may be, however, that MPs who believe the government does a better job of managing 
projects are the ones who support the government most and thus are driving the results. In order 
to explore this idea, we examine the subgroup effects of those MPs who think the government is 
better at enacting public goods projects compared to those who think foreign donors are better. 
We tested this possibility and find no evidence in support of this alternative. See Appendix Figure 
A15 and Tables A7-A10.  
We also consider whether partisanship could be driving the observed effects. The sub-
group analysis contingent on party support (NRM vs non-NRM) shows that opposition-party sup-
porters in the citizenry are significantly more likely to endorse and act in favor of aid projects 
than the government condition. But we emphasize that, while this is true for citizens, among MPs 
it is the opposition-party members who most strongly support projects in the government con-
                                                     
59 See Appendix Table A11. 
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dition, against the expectations that governing-party NRM MPs would most strongly support pro-
jects assumed to come from government. This evidence works against the argument that party 
affiliation is the key conditioning factor. 
Mechanisms Implied by Donor Control Theory 
The donor control argument implies that MPs should have a weaker preference for funds 
that donors can control, but a stronger preference for funds that are not as easily controlled by 
external actors. We first compared MPs and masses on whether they believe that the conditions 
donors impose on aid help or hurt Uganda and find that the public sees conditions as helping the 
country, but MPs see them as hurting, thus suggesting that MPs may not see foreign aid as easy 
to capture.60 We unpacked this through qualitative interviews with 28 MPs in which we asked 
MPs with whom they would prefer to implement the education or electricity project (where the 
funder was not specified). Fifty-nine percent said they would prefer to work with the government 
to implement the project. Of these MPs, many directly referenced the lack of conditionality and 
greater control over government projects. One MP said that s/he would rather work with the 
government on implementing the project because “one would be sure of the project and there 
could be no conditionalities.” An overwhelming majority of these MPs who preferred that the 
government implement the project said aid is more constrained (14 of 16; 88%) and that aid has 
more rules and regulations (15 of 16; 94%). Thus, the same MPs who prefer government funding 
                                                     
60 See Appendix Table A12. 
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of a project are also overwhelmingly the same MPs who say aid projects have too many condi-
tions and are too constrained. These views support the idea that donors have significant control 
over aid.  
A second, more direct way to consider implications that donors control aid is to examine 
perceptions of clientelism and corruption, which may shape support for foreign assistance vs. 
domestic programs. Evidence in favor of the corruption and clientelism mechanism would indi-
cate that citizens who believe that the government is corrupt and clientelist would prefer foreign 
aid projects as donors can exercise more control and enable effective aid delivery. MPs should 
have the opposite preference.  When politicians see corruption in government it may be a boon 
to them personally or electorally, and hence they may prefer government projects because they 
provide an easier way to avoid donor control and instead access money for their own interests.  
In the original survey, we asked both MPs and citizens whether government funds are 
most likely “to benefit government officials and their political allies” or “help those most in need” 
to capture aspects of both clientelism and corruption (using money to help friends and them-
selves). Both are intimately linked concepts in Africa because corruption largely sustains clien-
telism.61 We see a very large difference between the public and MPs in their perceptions of 
corruption and clientelism: 75 percent of the public believes that current government leaders 
take government money to benefit themselves and their friends rather than everyone in the 
                                                     
61 Szeftel 2000. 
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country, while only 35 percent of the MPs agree with this statement. We therefore use this ques-
tion to divide the sample into those who see government funds as more susceptible to capture 
and abuse and those who do not.  
Although the corruption question may be vulnerable to social desirability bias, further 
analysis mitigates the concern. If some MPs are more susceptible to social desirability pressures, 
then we should expect a strong positive correlation between low perceptions of corruption and 
other questions reflecting socially desirable responses, such as reporting more visits to the MP’s 
constituency, perceiving a good economy, and claiming better attendance at plenary sessions of 
parliament. However, answers to these questions are never strongly and positively correlated 
with low corruption perceptions. There is a weak negative correlation (Pearson’s r) between low 
corruption reports and claiming more days spent in the MP’s constituency each month (r=-0.12; 
p=0.00). There is a weak positive correlation between low corruption reports and maintaining 
that the national economy is in at least a “good” condition (r=0.10; p=0.01). Finally there is a 
weak negative correlation between low corruption reports and declaring higher rates of attend-
ance at plenary sessions of parliament (r=-0.07; p=0.30). There seems to be no consistent social 
desirability bias.  
The analysis for MPs shows that MPs who believe government funds are more likely to be 
used for corruption and clientelism are significantly more likely to prefer government-funded 
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projects.62 For 5 of the 9 outcomes, MPs who see government funds as more corrupt and clien-
telist are significantly more likely to prefer government funds. Importantly, these effects are 
strongly significant for the behavioral outcomes. The treatment effects range from 4% to 19%, 
the latter of which appear to be substantial effect sizes. When we limit the analysis to one obser-
vation per MP, the results are similarly strong. In 4 of the 9 conditions, including the petition to 
the president outcome, the results are substantively and statistically strong (Figure 3).  
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 Conversely, the difference in support for aid and government projects is not statistically 
significant for MPs who do not perceive significant corruption and clientelism.63 This suggests 
that the MPs who see few avenues for corruption and clientelism express no preference for gov-
ernment-funded projects over aid. One plausible interpretation of these results suggests that if 
the MP cannot capture some of the funding, then s/he does not manifest a clear preference to-
ward such projects.  
The results in Figure 3 and Appendix Table A6 report the difference-in-means tests and 
support the claim that citizen support for aid is also conditional on their perceptions of corruption 
and clientelism, but in the opposite direction. Citizens who believe that government funds are 
used for corruption and clientelism are significantly more likely to support aid over government 
projects for 3 of the 6 outcomes (4 of the 6 at the 0.1 level). Among subjects who do not perceive 
                                                     
62 Reported in Figure 3 and Appendix Table A5. 
63 This is true for all outcome measures; see Appendix Table A5. 
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the corrupt use of government funds, there are no significant differences. See also Appendix Ta-
bles A15-A16. These results are even stronger if we use only those who passed our manipulation 
checks. The analysis in Figure A18 of the appendix shows that for all but one outcome, the results 
are substantively and statistically strong for those passing the manipulation check. To provide 
context we further considered who among the masses and MPs perceives corruption. We esti-
mated models that use various attributes of citizens and MPs to predict perceptions of corruption 
in Appendix Tables A13 and A14 and discuss those results there.  
It is interesting to note that we do not find differences among donors for either the public 
or MPs. Other studies have speculated that multilateral aid donors might differ from bilateral 
ones.64 We examined two bilateral aid donors (USAID and China) and two multilateral ones 
(World Bank and African Development Bank) plus a generic multilateral and bilateral aid prompt. 
We found no consistent and significant differences among the public or MPs in their views of 
these donors, as we show briefly in Table A11 in the appendix. Both sets of donors try to maintain 
control over aid, often in distinct ways: USAID through independent contracting and the World 
Bank through stringent procurement and accounting rules. Knowledge does not appear to medi-
ate this result. MPs who are aware of aid also showed little knowledge of the purported differ-
ences among donors, and this casts doubt on the existence of such differences; second, the public 
was very knowledgeable about politics in general, making it harder to dismiss their lack of 
knowledge about aid. 
                                                     
64 Alesina and Dollar 2000; Findley, Milner, and Nielson 2016. 
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In sum, this analysis provides support for the argument that citizens support aid over gov-
ernment programs conditional on their perceptions of corruption and clientelism. Further, we 
find that citizens do consider corruption a bad thing: people who perceive there to be more cor-
ruption are significantly less likely to trust parliament, their MPs, and the president (effects are 
significant at the 0.01 levels).   
These analyses offer some evidence that political elites, including the parliamentary lead-
ership, may believe that government funds are more susceptible to clientelism and corruption 
and therefore prefer such funding. Ordinary citizens who perceive corruption and clientelism in 
government behave in ways that suggest they see aid-funded projects as a more preferred mech-
anism than government action to obtain the public goods that they so desperately want. These 
findings are consistent with the belief that donors exercise significant control over aid. 
Robustness 
Here, we discuss two important aspects of our experimental design. First, we discuss the 
cost condition, which addresses the difference between “tax-based” government projects and 
foreign-funded aid projects even though, as we argue below, this characterization is not accurate 
in the context of the study. Second, we discuss the fact that the control condition does not ex-
plicitly name the government as the funder but is nevertheless interpreted as the government. 
Taxed Government Projects versus Free Aid Projects: A False Dichotomy 
A first design objection might be that the public prefers aid because it is viewed as free, 
whereas government projects require citizens to pay taxes. We do not believe this is the factor 
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driving our results for several reasons. First, we added the cost statement to both the treatment 
and control conditions, so that individuals are aware that any project may require local funds.  
Second, we undertook a follow-up study in September of 2012 in which we recruited an 
additional 460 subjects and randomly assigned half to receive the cost statement in association 
with one of the two randomly assigned project descriptions. The cost statement had no signifi-
cant treatment effect on subjects’ support. This may be either because the cost statement was 
too weak to produce treatment effects or because subjects were indifferent to costs for projects 
they feel they desperately need. While the cost statement may be weak, multiple reasons lead 
us to believe that citizens are relatively indifferent to costs for public goods.  
First, subjects likely do not see government projects as costly to themselves any more 
than foreign aid is costly.  The vast majority of Ugandans — 86 percent in our nationally repre-
sentative subject pool — fall below the earnings threshold for paying income tax, which is roughly 
$600 per year. As Martin and Fjeldstad and Therkildsen note, Ugandan tax rates have been re-
duced recently. Most Ugandans also do not pay indirect taxes.65 Eighty percent of Ugandans live 
in rural areas and more than ninety percent of our subjects reported earning less than two dollars 
per day in income.  Most are not part of the formal economy and hence do not pay indirect taxes 
like the VAT.66 Using self-reported income data, we considered whether those making enough to 
                                                     
65 Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008; Martin 2014.  
66 As Kagambirwe (2014: 62) notes, “The majority of Ugandans that stay in rural areas of Uganda have no stable 
income amongst which the government can tax them. This thus leads to having a very limited domestic tax base 
amongst which URA can tax its citizens. It also limits the informal taxes such as Value Added Tax (VAT) income tax 
and pay as you earn (PAYEE) because the level of consumption of these commodities is low. Also the level of unem-
ployment is so high thus limiting the citizens in earning money amongst which they can be taxed in form of pay as 
you earn (PAYEE).” 
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pay taxes responded differently than those who did not. If taxes are important, then we should 
observe differences between the two groups. As reported in Appendix Figures A16 and A17, how-
ever, we do not observe any significant differences in most cases.  
The Government Control Condition 
A second design objection might be that the government was not named explicitly in the 
control condition. We were concerned about social desirability in responses if we labeled the 
control as the government. This is not a trivial concern as the Afrobarometer data show (see 
footnote 46). For the citizens, we worried that they might fear government reactions and so al-
ways rank the government projects first.  For the MPs, we feared social desirability bias in which 
they always said they preferred the government projects since they were part of the government.  
To assess what citizens perceived when they viewed the control condition, as well as what 
the implications of this are, we conducted a follow-up mass survey in September of 2012, and we 
found that the majority of subjects did interpret the control condition as the government (52% 
and 51% for the education and electricity projects, respectively). More than one third of subjects 
in the follow-up study, however, attributed the control condition to a foreign donor. Our follow-
up interviews with MPs in 2015 suggest similar proportions, as noted below. While a more direct 
comparison may have been preferable, attribution of the control projects to foreign donors 
works in favor of the null hypothesis of no treatment effects.  
The concern is that the control condition represented a combination of people who be-
lieve it implied either the government or a foreign aid donor; that is, support for the control is 
equal to some average of support for foreign aid projects combined with support for government 
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projects.  Because we know two of these three values — the outcome in the control condition 
overall and the outcome in the foreign aid condition, we can calculate the third: the level of sup-
port that subjects would provide had they been given the government control condition explic-
itly.   
First, we know the average value that mass and MP respondents gave in support of the 
projects if they were assigned a foreign donor. In the two surveys we asked about support for 
the projects using 6 different aid donors for the masses and 4 for the MPs, assigning each subject 
a donor at random. Our data show that across all these foreign donors, the mass respondents 
did not differentiate significantly between them, but on average they supported the projects that 
were labeled as foreign-funded at a higher level than did the control group for which the donor 
was not named. We have similar evidence for the MPs, except the MPs, on the other hand, sup-
ported all the aid projects on average less than the control condition. This implies that we can 
calculate an average value of support among the mass public and MPs for projects led by any 
foreign donor.  
Second, on average the control group's level of support for the projects was lower than 
the average for all the foreign-donor treatment groups for the mass experiment. For the MPs, 
the control groups’ support was higher than for all the foreign aid projects.  Third, our post-survey 
data show that 51% or 52%, depending on the random assignment of electricity or education 
project, respectively, believe that the control was a government project and most of the remain-
ing believed it was a foreign donor. So the actual value of support for the control group for those 
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who thought it was the government can be deduced from this information. In the mass experi-
ment it must necessarily be lower than that for the group that was given the foreign aid condi-
tions, while in the MP experiment it must be higher.  
We can use these three pieces of information to calculate the mean and standard errors 
of the mass respondents who attributed the control condition to the government. We can only 
obtain an estimate for the MPs since we did not ask them who they thought was funder in the 
control condition, but this still implies what the control group who attributed it to the govern-
ment would have scored.   We know that the mean of the control group is made up of the re-
spondents who thought that the control was a foreign donor and those who thought the control 
was the government: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙̂ =  𝛼 ∗ 𝐺𝑜?̂? + (1 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛̂  
where 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙̂  and 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛̂  are the average levels of support for the development projects un-
der the control and treatment conditions, respectively. These values are known from the data 
and 𝛼 is the percentage identifying the control as the government. Rearranging to solve for 𝐺𝑜?̂? 
we derive: 
𝐺𝑜?̂? =
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙̂ − (1 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛̂
𝛼
 
Calculating the standard error to create the confidence intervals is a little more difficult and we 
describe the procedure in the appendix. Using these calculated means and standard deviations, 
we can compare those receiving the foreign treatment to the control condition as reported in 
the paper to the portion of control respondents who thought the condition was the government. 
Appendix Figure A19 demonstrates the relative differences for the strong support condition 
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among the masses. For all other outcome conditions for masses and MPs, this relative ordering 
holds and so we do not display them here. As the figure shows, the difference between those 
receiving the explicit foreign condition and those thinking the control represented the govern-
ment is much larger than between the explicitly foreign condition and the undifferentiated con-
trol. The direction of the effect is opposite in the MP case. Thus, the design choice we made 
works against our hypotheses and therefore provides a very conservative test; had we named 
the government explicitly in the control condition, we would have observed much larger differ-
ences and our results would be even stronger. 
In 2015 we conducted a small follow-up study on MPs we had surveyed before. In these 
interviews we told them about one of our two projects but not the name of the funding organi-
zation; that is, we gave them the control condition from our prior study. Then we asked them 
who they think funded this and close to 40% said the Uganda government in part at least (11 of 
28).  This of course means that some MPs, like some citizens, perceived the control condition as 
sponsored by foreign donors. Again, this would have led to an understatement of the difference 
between treatment and control in the MP experiment.  
Another concern may be that MPs may merely have a preference for unspecified over 
specified funding. We note in response that two of the foreign donor conditions were deliber-
ately generic in that they attributed the projects to either an unspecified multilateral or bilateral 
donor. As we show in the Appendix Table A11, MPs did not significantly prefer these generic 
conditions to conditions in which the World Bank or the United States were named, which leads 
us to discount the possibility that MPs prefer projects with unspecified donors. Rather, it appears 
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more likely that their attribution of the control projects to the government prompted the treat-
ment effects. 
 
Conclusion 
Who controls aid? Our experiment suggests that elites and the public both perceive that 
donors exert substantial influence over foreign assistance. This article provides what is, to our 
knowledge, the first experimental study to compare aid preferences and actions for members of 
parliament and a nationally representative sample of ordinary citizens in a prominent developing 
country. Citizens preferred aid over government programs consistently, especially in the behav-
ioral outcomes. This was particularly so among the respondents who perceived problems with 
government corruption and clientelism, thus providing evidence consistent with the argument 
that aid can help overcome governance problems. In contrast, members of parliament consist-
ently preferred government programs over aid and especially for those MPs perceiving corrup-
tion and clientelism.  
The study brings together two complimentary literatures. The large literature on clien-
telism and corruption in developing countries shows that governments have the desire and will 
to use their funds to promote their own political purposes first and foremost. Staying in office is 
critical and using government projects to build support is one way to do this. Uganda’s govern-
ment is no exception. However, aid scholars often assess foreign assistance without any direct 
comparison to the most realistic alternative, which is government funding. Our study examines 
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the beliefs and actions of both elites and citizens by comparing their support for these two dif-
ferent sources of development finance.  
The study provides evidence that both elites and citizens in Uganda believe that donors 
have significant control over aid and little encouragement for the notion that elites largely cap-
ture foreign assistance. The provision of aid involves a bargaining relationship between donors 
and recipient governments; the balance of power between them depends on the situation.  The 
end of the Cold War and the experiences of donors with corrupt and autocratic governments 
seem to have lent impetus to much greater efforts at donor control, as many studies show.67 Our 
study also finds that public and elite perceptions reflect this greater sense of donor control. The 
idea that aid is highly fungible and that recipient governments can do as they please with it finds 
little support in the results. Indeed, on nearly every measure elites prefer the control condition 
implying government funding to the treatment conditions naming foreign donors, sometimes 
significantly so, and these results largely strengthen when examining MPs who strongly perceive 
government corruption. Citizens move in the opposite direction: they significantly prefer foreign 
aid across several attitudinal and behavioral measures to projects implying government sponsor-
ship, and this is especially so for citizens perceiving meaningful levels of corruption.  
Neither elites nor citizens are indifferent between aid and government–funded projects. 
Elites and citizens have distinct preferences. Citizens are more willing to support aid by taking 
behavioral actions imposing personal costs through signing a petition and sending an SMS. They 
                                                     
67 Bearce and Tirone 2010; Bermeo 2008; Dunning 2004. 
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also on average view aid as less politicized than government programs and trust foreign donor 
institutions more than domestic ones; and they see conditionality as often helping the country, 
not hurting it.68 This provides support for the belief that donors can exert some control over for-
eign assistance, which argues that aid donors strategically control their aid through channeling, 
monitoring, and bypassing.  
Again suggesting beliefs consistent with donor control, political elites proved less enthu-
siastic about aid than government-funded projects. MPs likely face fewer constraints over how 
they utilize domestic government resources. High levels of corruption and clientelism exist in 
developing countries even in the absence of foreign aid. And domestic resources may be even 
easier for governments to divert to these purposes since there are often no strong accountability 
mechanisms in poor developing countries.  MPs on average had high levels of trust in foreign aid 
institutions, and many thought they were more effective at providing and more successful at 
concluding development projects.  But they also thought aid was too constrained by conditional-
ity, rules and regulations and hence more costly to deal with than government funds.  
Our comparison of masses and elites helps to resolve a novel puzzle about divergent pref-
erences for development assistance. Martin, for instance, hypothesizes that elites and masses 
have different preferences about development projects, with the public favoring public goods 
more than elites.69  Our results support this supposition, suggesting that aid recipients should not 
be treated as a unitary group. Furthermore, our study pursues distinct observable implications 
                                                     
68 Milner, Nielson, and Findley 2016. 
69 Martin 2014. 
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of the argument that donors have significant control over aid, namely, that citizens perceiving 
greater corruption and clientelism should prefer stronger foreign donors who can deliver aid, 
whereas elites should prefer the opposite. Our findings support other research that shows aid 
revenue should not produce a political curse because it is less fungible, more conditional, and 
less constant than other non-tax revenues, making it difficult for recipient governments to use 
aid to fund either repression or appeasement.70 The study thus finds evidence in favor of donor 
control and little support for aid capture.  
These conclusions have more than academic implications. More than in most issue areas, 
policymakers at multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have developed close ties to scholars stud-
ying foreign aid. In several recent instances, aid policymakers have adjusted policies toward con-
clusions drawn from academic literatures. Yet prominent studies have proposed that aid fosters 
corruption and autocracy and therefore imply that aid should be reduced or even abandoned. 
The results of this study, by contrast, suggest that donors are aware of the risks and try to manage 
aid to benefit publics and bypass political capture. Indeed, both citizens and elites in Uganda see 
these efforts as effective. Moreover, our study suggests that donors should do more to condition 
and monitor aid, not less, in order to foster development.  As seen from the ground level, foreign 
assistance can under certain conditions promote rather than hinder development. 
  
                                                     
70 Altincekic and Bearce 2014. 
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Figure 1: Difference in Means Tests Comparing MPs and Masses 
Note: Difference in means for mass and MPs. 90% confidence intervals. Positive differences mean that 
foreign aid is preferred to government funding. 
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Figure 2: Difference in Means Tests Masses passing manipulation 
 
Note: difference in means with 90% confidence intervals for mass who passed manipulation checks. Positive 
differences mean that foreign aid is preferred to government funding.   
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Figure 3: Difference in Means for Corruption/Clientelism Mechanism 
 
 
Note: Difference in means with 90% confidence intervals for masses and MPs who do not perceive corrup-
tion or clientelism in the government vs. those who do. Positive differences mean that foreign aid is pre-
ferred to government funding. This graph shows that masses have strong preferences for foreign aid when 
they perceive corruption. MPs who perceive corruption, on the other hand, prefer government funds over 
aid. 
 
 
